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Cash Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretation
of Section 14(e)
the frequency of corporate takeover
attempts in the form of cash tender offers has increased dramatically.1 During most of this period, cash tender offers were outside the
N THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS,

scope of the federal securities laws. It was not until 1968 that Congress
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 by passing the Williams
Act 3 for the express purpose of placing the, cash tender offer under

federal regulation. 4 Section 14(e), 5 the antifraud provision of the
Williams Act, has been much litigated in the short time since its passage,6 and the meaning of the section is slowly being clarified.
This note is an analysis of a recent case from the Second Circuit7
Court of Appeals, Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. v. PiperAircraft Corp.,
the leading case on section 14 (e), and of its ramifications concerning

I In 1960 there were only eight cash tender offers involving companies listed on national
securities exchanges, whereas in 1966 there were over one hundred such offers. 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, at 2812 (1968) [Hereinafter referred to as 2 U.S.
CODE NEWS].
[Securities Exchange Act of 1934 hereinafter referred to as
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970)
the 1934 Act].
3
Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), amending 15 U.S.C. §§78m-n (1964)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970)) [Hereinafter referred to as
the 1968 amendments, the Williams Act, or the Act].
4The purpose of the legislation as originally proposed by Senator Williams in 1965 was
to protect incumbent management from "corporate raiders." By the time of introduction
of S.B. 510, which eventually was enacted as P.L. 90-439, he had recognized the desirability of permitting corporate takeovers as an aid in eliminating inefficient management.

Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269, 275
(1969).

5 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
6
See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973);
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cit. 1969);
92,686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Neuman v.
Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
Electronic Specialty Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
7480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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cash tender offers. The first part will treat cash tender offers and the
legislation passed in 1968 in general, and the second part, Chris-Craft
and its ramifications.
Cash Tender Offers
The tender offer has been defined as a:
. . . public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual, or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period
of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a
publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified
terms for cash and/or securities.8
A tender offer normally involves two corporate parties, the tender
offeror 9 and the target corporation, 10 as well as the shareholders of
the target corporation. The purpose behind the tender offer is to
acquire sufficient shares of the target from the target's shareholders
to enable the tender offeror to take control of the target. In comparison
with other methods of corporate acquisition, the cash tender offer
presents a number of distinct advantages.1 A tender offer can often
be much less costly than a merger or a sale of assets. Since the tender
offeror need only pay for the number of shares required for control,
the predominant cost of a tender offer is the premium paid above the
market price.12 In a merger or sale of assets, on the other hand, the

8 Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27 Bus. LAw.
415 (1972). But see Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1973), wherein the relatively
recent expansion of the term "tender offer" is set out.
A tender offeror is one who seeks to acquire control of a corporation through a tender
offer. The fundamental mechanics of a tender offer are described in Sowards & Moksky,
Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
499, 502 (1967) :
The mechanics of the take over bid are simple. Typically X, the person seeking
to acquire control, or X's agent, will make an offer by newspaper advertisement
to purchase for cash a certain number of shares of Y corporation at a fixed price
that is set above the current market price. Y corporation shareholders are invited
to tender their shares for purchase by X or X's agent. More specifically, Y corporation shareholders who wish to accept the offer are instructed (1) to send a
"letter of transmittal", accompanied by their stock certificates in transferable
form, to X or X's agent, or (2) to request their bank or broker to effect the
tender transaction for them. A date and hour for termination of the purchase
offer are stated.
The tender offeror is likely to be a glamour company, one whose price to earnings ratio
is exceptionally high as a result of its attraction to the public. Cohen, Tender Offers and
Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968).
10
A target corporation is the object a tender offeror seeks to aquire through his tender
offer. The target is not likely to be a glamour girl, but rather a wall flower, a company
whose stocks, not currently in public favor, have a low price-to-earnings ratio. Cohen,
supra note 9.
" See generally Fleischer and Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 317, 318-21 (1967); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REV. 377, 378-79
(1969).
12See Note, Tender Offers: The Liberalization of Standing Requirements under Section
14(e), 7 U. SAN. FR. L. REV. 561 (1973).
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purchasing company would normally pay for all of the target's assets. 13 Perhaps most important is the fact that the incumbent manage14
ment of the target must agree to a merger, or a sale of its assets.
Thus, if management opposes such a takeover, the only resort is to a
proxy contest. But the poor likelihood of success coupled with the slim
prospects for recovery of expenses, together suggest that a proxy
contest might better be avoided."5
There are two basic types of tender offers. 16 The cash tender
offer is a simple cash-for-stock transaction with the offeror paying
cash for the stock of the target corporation. The exchange tender
offer is an exchange of stock of the offeror for stock of the target.
Before the 1968 amendments, the latter was seldom used because
of the requirement that a registration statement be filed with and
declared effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).17 Indeed, prior to the 1968 amendments, most securities
lawyers agreed that in a contested takeover situation a cash offer was
mandatory for success, whereas a stock exchange offer had much
less chance of success.18
In sharp contrast to the regulation of an exchange offer, before
the 1968 amendments, cash tender offers were subject to little legal
control.1 9 The majority of tender offer suits were brought under section
10(b) 20 and its implementing SEC rule 10b-5.2 The courts generally
employed one of two theories in deciding these cases. The first was
that a private suit under rule 10b-5 had to be brought by a purchaser
or seller, and since neither nontendering shareholders nor target
22
corporations are purchasers or sellers, they generally could not sue.
13Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 11, at 318.
14 Id.

Is See Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 8; Note, Judical Enforcement of the Williams Amendments, 27 Bus. LAW. 391, 392 n. 3 (1972); Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 11,
at 379.
16The term "tender offer", as such, is misleading, in its place a new term has been suggested,
"tender request". Note, The Developing Meaning of '"Tender Offer" Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 8, at 1251 n. 7.
17A stock exchange is considered an issuance of securities; and the offeror must file a
registration statement with the SEC, which must make the statement effective before the
exchange can take place. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h, j (1970).
8
7 Wander, Selecting Targets and Shaping Strategy in Corporate Take-Overs; Securities
Law-Considerations,24 Sw. L.J. 593, 594 (1970).
1"See generally 6 Loss, Securities Regulation 3620-24 (Supp. 1969); Note, Cash Tender
Offers, supra note 11, at 380; Note, Tender Offers: The Liberalization of Standing, supra
note 12, at 562-64.
20 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2117

C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).

22See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952) (rule 10b-5 extends protection only to defrauded purchasers or
sellers). But cf. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967) ( nontendering plaintiff found to be forced seller and therefore
(Continued on next page)
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The second was that offerors, as outsiders, had no duty to disclose n6n23
inside information; hence, there was no liability for failure to do so.
It was to close this gap in the federal securities laws that Congress
enacted the 1968 amendments to the 1934 Act. 24
The amendments result in broad regulation of various areas of
the tender offer proceeding.25 In general, they provide for the filing
of a statement with the SEC, the target, and any exchange trading in
the target's securities before an offer is made.2 6 The offeror must
include in the statement his identity and background, the source and
amount of funds to be used in payment for tendered securities, any
plans or proposals for major changes in the structure of the target
corporation, the number of shares of the target corporation presently
owned, and the details of any arrangements with others concerning
the acquired securities.27 In addition, the amendments regulate the
mechanics of cash tender offers to some degree, 28 and give the SEC
rulemaking authority both to modify the statement requirements 2
and to regulate countersolicitations 30 and stock repurchases by
31
management.
While it is true that these provisions went far toward providing
full and fair disclosure of relevant information for the benefit of the
public investor, perhaps the most significant provision of Public Law
90-439 is section 14(e), the antifraud provision:

(Continued from preceding page)
within the Birnbaum doctrine); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967) (plaintiff given injunctive relief despite the fact that purchases were prior
to the violations in question). But Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d
963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970) again upheld the vitality of
Birnbaum and limited its exceptions to their facts.
23See Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F.Supp. 753, 765 (D.N.J. 1955) (outsider has no duty
to disclose information to stockholder to whom offer was made); cf. Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967) (outsider has no duty to disclose
information to stockholders to whom he makes no offer; but court indicated no opinion
concerning duty to stockholders to whom offer made).
242 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 1, at 2814.
2SSee generally Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 11, at 381-88.
261934 Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
171934 Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970), incorporated into § 14(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1970).
211934 Act § 14(d) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1970) (provides securities deposited
for purpose of tendering can be withdrawn within seven days of offer or after sixty days
from offer); 1934 Act § 14(d) (6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (1970) (provides for pro
rata purchase of shares tendered in first ten days of offer if less than all shares are to be
purchased); 1934 Act § 14(d) (7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (1970) (provides that if
consideration is increased during offer, all shareholders who tender, whether before or
after increase, shall be paid the increase). See also Hamilton, supra note 4, at 285-89.
291934 Act § 14(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1970).
301934 Act § 14(d) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (4) (1970).
311934 Act § 13(e) (1),

15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1)
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It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender
offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation
of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
32
offer, request, or invitation.
A number of cases have been decided on the basis of section 14(e);
the courts have settled some questions while raising others. 33 The most
recent of these cases, and certainly the most far-reaching, is ChrisCraft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.34
Chris-Craft
Chris-Craft is the major appellate decision under section 14(e)
of the 1968 amendments. The court, in an opinion written by Judge
Timbers, reviewed a consolidated appeal of three related lower court
decisions 3 involving a contest for control of the Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper). The court discussed the application of section 14(e)
to the issues of standing to sue, violations, causation, and the appropriate relief to be granted.
Factual Setting
In early 1969, Chris-Craft Industries (CCI) had made a cash
tender offer to Piper shareholders which Piper management, essentially the Piper family, opposed. Piper, in letters to its shareholders,
recommended rejection of the CCI offer, stating that it was "convinced
that it [the offer] is inadequate and not in the best interests of Piper's
shareholders."3 6 Piper later issued a press release announcing an
agreement to sell 300,000 unissued Piper shares to Grumman Aircraft

3215 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
33See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969); H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F.Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972),
afl'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cit. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 336 F.Supp.
890 (N.D. Me. 1971); Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,686 (E.D.N.Y.
92,591 (N.D. Ill.
1970); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., CCH Fed Sec. Rep.
1969).

-480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
3SThe three appeals were from: 1. a dismissal by the district court of Chris-Craft's complaint against all defendants on grounds that the alleged violations had either not been
proven or those that had been had not caused plaintiff any harm, Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F.Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 2. The dismissal by
the same court of Bangor Punta's complaints against Christ-Craft on grounds of lack of
evidence of securities laws violations and of injury to Bangor Punta, Bangor Punta Corp.
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 337 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 3. a denial, again by
the same court, of a permanent injunction against further violations by Bangor Punta
sought by the SEC, S.E.C. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F.Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
6480

F.2d at 351.
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Company (Grumman). Part of the agreement left unmentioned was
an option in Grumman to "put" the shares back to Piper for costs
plus interest if a proposed merger did not materialize. 37 Piper
eventually supported a competing exchange tender offer by Bangor
Punta Corporation (BPC). Both Piper and BPC announced BPC's
acquisition of the Piper family shares in Piper and an exchange offer
of BPC securities valued at $80 per share to the remaining shareholders. A further agreement- that if the value of the securities
received by the Piper family was less than $80 on the opening day of
the exchange offer, BPC would make up the difference - went unannounced. In addition, BPC failed to include in its registration statement information concerning its negotiations for the sale of its subsidiary, the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad (BAR), at a price
substantially below the value carried on its books. 39 In the meantime,
BPC continued to make purchases of Piper stock during the pendency
40
of its exchange tender offer, a further violation of the securities laws.
The culmination of these events was the withdrawal of CCI from the
contest, having spent over $44 million in cash and securities in a
losing effort, and the eventual acquisition by BPC of 51 % of the Piper
41
stock.
An action was brought in May, 1969 by CCI alleging violations
of various federal securities laws including rule 10b-5 and section
14 (e) by defendants Piper, BPC, First Boston Corporation (First
Boston) which was acting as BPC's underwriter, and various officers
and employees of each. CCI had originally sought damages and equitable relief, but the affirmance on appeal of the district court's denial
of a preliminary injunction left only the question of damages to be
considered on remand. 42 The district court subsequently dismissed
CCI's complaint, and an appeal followed. 3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by
Judge Timbers, held: 1. that CCI, as an unsucessful contestant in a
tender offer contest, had standing under section 14(e) to sue defendants for damages; 2. that the actions of defendants amounted to
violations of section 14 (e) ; 3. that the conduct of the defendants in
violation of section 14 (e) caused injury to CCI for which it was
entitled to be compensated.
37

This arrangement was conditioned on the new shares being listed by the New York
Stock Exchange; when listing was refused, the agreement was terminated. Id. at 351-52.

38Id. at 353.
39

Id. at 367.
The court (id. at 378)
(1973).
41Id. at 354.
42Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
F.Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
43
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
40

held this to be a violation of Rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6

v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 303
1969).
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F.Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Judge Mansfield, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, concurred
in the results reached by Judge Timbers as to the liability of the
defendants, with the exception of the Piper family, whose actions,
he felt, had not caused any damage to CCI. Judge Mansfield further
dissented as to Judge Timbers' analysis of the issues of scienter and
reliance.
Standing
Judge Timbers in his opinion initially focused on the meaning of
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak4 as it applies to a private action for violations
of the federal securities laws. He alluded to the recognition by the
Supreme Court that private actions for damages are a necessary
adjunct to SEC enforcement of the federal securities laws. He then
noted the congressional purpose behind the enaction of the antifraud
provisions was to protect the public investor and to ensure the integrity
and efficiency of the securities markets. 45 Thus, the interests at stake
make the encouragement of private damage actions to implement the
enforcement of the federal securities laws essential.
The legislative history of section 14 (e) 46 was next cited, together
with H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co.,4 7 to demonstrate
that section 14 (e) was meant to make the antifraud proscriptions of
the federal securities laws directly applicable to tender offers. The
conclusion followed that section 14 (e), rather than section 10 (b) and
rule 10b-5, provided the appropriate basis for CCI's standing to sue.4
The application of fundamental logic to the question will yield
a similar conclusion. Rule 10b-5 already covered purchases and sales
of stock generally, including tender offers, but a right of action under
it is limited to the purchasers and sellers. If section 14(e) is to have
any meaning whatsoever, it must either supplement or supplant the
application of 10b-5. At first glance one would expect the former, but,
as will be seen, the court went on to show that section 14 (e) is little
more than a replica of parts of rule 10b-5, without the disabling
purchaser-seller limitation. For this reason, in a practical sense, section 14 (e) supplants rule 10b-5 as it applies to tender offers, and, as
Judge Timbers observed, provides the appropriate basis for CCI's
standing to sue.

377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). In Borak the Court found that private suits are permissible
under § 27 of the 1934 Act for violations of § 14(a).
45480 F.2d at 357.
46

See 2 U.S. CODE NEwS, supra note 1, at 2821.
47 353 F.Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). "The plain language
of § 14(e), as well as its legislative history, indicate that a tender offeror has standing to
seek damages for misrepresentations made by the target corporation."
480 F.2d at 359.
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Judge Timbers then raised the question of CCI's standing to sue
for the alleged violations of section 14(e). In holding that CCI had
standing to sue, he divided the issue into several subissues. Unfortunately, his failure to distinguish effectively among them left the
holding fraught with needless complexity. He first determined that
CCI had standing to sue in the constitutional sense. 49 This was based
on the rationale that CCI had "'a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy,' because it has suffered a pecuniary loss directly attributable to defendants' acts."50 As Judge Mansfield noted in his concurring
and dissenting opinion, standing in the constitutional sense was hardly
the issue."1 In spite of this, an evocation of the concept was helpful, if
only to distinguish it from the problem of statutory construction.
Treatment was next accorded the second subissue: whether a
private right of action existed under federal law. In the determination
that CCI had a private right of action for damages, several cases
previously decided by the Second Circuit were cited. In Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,s2 a target corporation
and a nontendering shareholder were held to have standing under
section 14 (e) to seek a preliminary injunction against a tender offeror.
In Butler Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers,
Inc., 3 a target corporation was again held to have standing to seek
a preliminary injunction against a tender offeror. Furthermore, dicta
in two cases had suggested that section 14 (e) might provide standing
to a tender offeror against a target corporation.1 The common law
49

The court addressed itself to the question of whether CCI had "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness .. .upon which the
court .. .depends .... " Id. at 359 n. 11, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968),
quoting in turn Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
10480 F.2d at 359, quoting in part Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
5 480 F.2d at 396, Judge Mansfield suggested that the question of standing in the
constitutional sense could be settled by a reference to the Supreme Court's decision in
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970). There the Court said that the question of standing concerns "the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
" This is, in essence,
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ....
what Judge Timbers referred to in his statements.
52409 F.2d 937 (2d Cit. 1969).
- 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cit. 1970).
S4In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970), a case similar to Chris-Craft in the reaction by the target company;
Crane had atempted a merger with Air Brake, which was rebuffed by incumbent management. Air Brake executed a number of defensive maneuvers to prevent Crane from getting
control, and they eventually settled on a strategic retreat - a merger with American
Standard. Before voting on the merger could take place Crane made a tender offer to the
shareholders of Air Brake of stock and debentures worth $50 in exchange for Air Brake
stock, which was then selling at $49. The last day of the tender offer was critical for
Crane, since shareholders were waiting to see how high the stock would go before making
their decision. On this last day the stock opened at 45 , but quickly rose to over 50,
thus defeating Crane's tender offer. The court found that defendant Standard was
responsible for the stock rise due to its market manipulation of buying large blocks of
stock on the last day of the offer. The court felt that Crane had standing to sue on the
(Continued on next page)
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tort principle of interference with a "prospective advantage" was
then suggested as a possible means whereby CCI could obtain relief in
the state courts as an injured party where the means of interference
adopted were unlawful. Judge Timbers surmised that the existence
of such a claim under common law, coupled with the silence of the
federal statute on the subject, was sufficient reason for assuming that
Congress had no intention of denying a federal remedy.55 Judge
Timbers then offered the following synthesis. Citing the legislative
history of the 1968 amendments, he noted that "the focus of legislative interest was on the public shareholder. 5' 6 From this, he ascertained the general objective of the statute - "to encourage extensive
and accurate disclosure of information relevant to a tender offer."5
Referring to the holding of the Supreme Court in Borak, he observed
that a private right of action should be implied when it would further
the general objective of the securities laws involved. He then concluded
that the most reliable way to effectuate the general objective of
section 14 (e) is to grant standing to sue to the victim of violations
of the statute.- With a final reference to common law principles of
tort, Judge Timbers determined that CCI was such a victim, and
therefore had a private right of action for damages.
Interspersed throughout this reasoning was a third subissue whether CCI was protected by the statute and would therefore have
a claim for compensatory damages.5 It would seem that the decision
that CCI was a victim of violations of the statute and, therefore,
would have standing to sue carried with it an implication that CCI
was also protected under the statute. Judge Timbers offered a further
rationale for this implication when he echoed Judge Friendly's opinion
in Electronic Specialty:
(Continued from preceding page)
forced seller rationale under rule 10b-5 since Crane was forced to divest itself of all stock
in Air Brake because Standard was a competitor, and owning stock in Standard violated
the anti-trust laws. The court also observed in dicta that, although § 14(e) became

effective subsequent to the events of the case, it would "serve to resolve any doubts about
standing in the tender offer cases ... " Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., supra
at 798-99. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), the court held that a tender offeror did not have standing to sue target management, which had alledgedly fraudulently persuaded the shareholders to sell their shares
to management rather than the offeror. While the court's rationale for not granting
standing- because the plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller of securities- is disheartening, it did indicate in dicta that, had § 14(e) been applicable, standing would have been
granted. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., supra at 969-70.
55480 F.2d at 361.
56

1d.
571d.
2 Id.
5'The problem of compensatory damages as proper relief under § 14(e) in an action by
a tender offeror against a target corporation had not been dealt with before by this
court. It was necessary to determine whether CCI had standing to sue because its interests
are protected under the statute, or whether CCI had standing to sue on behalf of those
whose interests were protected. In the latter case compensatory damages would not
normally be proper relief, Id. at 360 n. 12.
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Since Rule 10b-5 covers all types of exchange offers, the
major contribution provided by section 14(e) would appear
to be a broader standing to sue - accorded both to the offeror
and to the opposition - based on fraudulent securities
60
transactions.
He thus reasoned that although it was not explicitly indicated by
Congress, a broader class than just shareholders of the target were
entitled to the protection of the statute. 61
Judge Timbers took a number of circuitous routes to arrive at
his conclusions. In so doing, he strained his reasoning beyond what
was required. His reliance on the common law tort principle of interference with a "prospective advantage" to determine the victim of
a 14(e) violation, and to justify inferring a federal remedy for such
a violation, was both confusing and probably unnecessary. He seemed
to be looking ahead to his ruling on the question of relief and fashioning his standing rationale around his decision on the measure of
damages. 62 On the one hand, the rationale is applicable to the determination of a victim, since it is unlikely that a tender offeror will be
bringing an action under 14 (e) wherein he will not also, in effect,
be alleging tortious interference with his attempted tender offer.
On the other hand, however, the fact that conduct is tortious and that
a remedy for it is found in the state courts, does not imply that a
similar remedy exists, or even should exist, in the federal courts.6
Judge Mansfield felt that it would be sufficient to analogize section 14(e) to rule 10b-5. He noted that neither section 10(b) nor
rule 10b-5 expressly confers the right to sue on purchasers, sellers,
or exchangers of securities, yet their implied standing to sue has long
since been accepted. He therefore concluded from the Borak rationale,
that a similar implication of a private right of action under section
14(e) was required." This treatment avoided the complexity found
in the majority opinion without sacrificing the broad private actionenforcement rationale which was at the heart of the concept.

60 Id.

at 361.
61The court cited Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.Supp. 890, 914 (D. Me. 1971),
as support for its conclusion. In Dyer the court denied defendant offerors motion to
dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff shareholders of the offeror were within the class
for whom the protection of § 14(e) was designed, and therefore had standing to sue.
The court further implied that the class was in fact the investing public, since it was
for the protection of same from misleading tender offers that § 14(e) was enacted.
62The court determined that CCI was entitled to damages in the amount of the reduction
in value of CCI's Piper holdings attributable to BPC's taking a majority position in
Piper. 480 F.2d at 380.
3
6 See generally Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir.
1969), quoting Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1969).
6480

F.2d at 396.
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Thus, while Judge Timbers preferred a rigorous analytical approach to the standing question, and Judge Mansfield felt a simple
analogy would be sufficient, their conclusions are effectively identical.
They both recognized that CCI, as a tender offeror, was within the
class which section 14(e) was designed to protect, that the most
effective way to further the general objective of section 14 (e) was to
grant standing to sue to victims of its violations, and that CCI was
such a victim.
A review of the history of the standing problem as it relates
to rule 10b-5 points up the very real breakthrough which this ruling
effects.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.65 was the first major case
decided under rule 10b-5 which effectively limited standing to purchasers and sellers. There, the Second Circuit enunciated its purchaserseller limitation, which later enabled courts to summarily dismiss
cases falling outside the purchaser-seller class." Eventually, the
rigidity of the Birnbaum doctrine gave way somewhat in Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 67 wherein the court enunciated the forcedseller doctrine, which enabled it to grant standing to sue to the
plaintiff. This decision, as well as that in A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,6
suggested a relaxation of the Birnbaum doctrine, and lower courts
were quick to follow the lead. 69 However, in Iroquois Industries, Inc.
v. Syracuse China Corp.70 the court reasserted the Birnbaum doctrine
and made its application clear in damage actions. 71 This, then, was the
state of the law at the time the Williams Act was enacted, and it was
not until Chris-Craftthat the standing question was given the broad

65193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The court interpreted the
purchase or sale clause of rule 10b-5 to mean that a plaintiff must either be a purchaser
or seller of securities.
"See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F.Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
67 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). "It is precisely because
appellee gives no choice to Vine under the statute and the latter must now exchange his
shares for cash that appellant can now be deemed a seller .... " Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Co., supra at 635.
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). Brod was initially dismissed by the district court, because
plaintiff had not alleged that he was an investor or that fraud was associated with the
purchase or sale of securities. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that 10b-5 was enacted
for the benefit of the public and was not limited solely to investors. A. T. Brod & Co. v.
Perlow, supra at 397.
61 See Entel v. Allen, 270 F.Supp. 60, 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Moore v. Great-america
Corp., 274 F.Supp. (N.D. Ohio 1967), See also Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Blot, 267 F.Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
70 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970)
71 Contra, Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1969). See
note 54 supra.
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extension required to enable parties involved in the tender offer transaction to challenge effectively in the courts without having to fear
summary dismissal based on the purchaser-seller limitation.
The court has thus furthered a trend, which has been developing since the 1968 amendments, toward liberalizing standing to sue
under section 14(e).72 Though limited in this case to standing for a
defeated tender offeror, the private action-enforcement rationale lends
itself to situations wherein shareholders of either side seek relief for
misleading or deceptive conduct in connection with a tender offer.
Violations of Section 14(e)
Judge Timbers began his discussion of the defendants' alleged
violations of section 14(e) with an elucidation of the controlling
principles in the determination of such liability. He first observed that
he deemed the underlying proscription of section 14 (e) to be identical
to that of rule 1Ob-5, the critical difference being the latter's application only "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" as
opposed to the former's application "in connection with any tender
offer."73 For this reason, he chose to follow the principles developed
under rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of section 14 (e) violations.
Thus, a violation of section 14(e) is shown when:
. . . there has been a material misstatement or omission
concerned with a tender offer and when such misstatement
or omission was sufficiently culpable to justify granting relief
to the injured party. 74
Materiality
Judge Timbers found the standard of materiality for violations
of section 14 (e) to be identical to that articulated in a number of
cases decided under rule 10b-5: "whether a reasonable man would
attach importance to the fact misrepresented in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question. 75 The analogy of
violations of section 14(e) to those of rule 10b-5 is, in itself, an
expansion on the former comparison to violations of section 14(a)
on proxy regulations. 76 With the introduction of the less stringent
standard of materiality, however, Judge Timbers has greatly enlarged
the scope of materiality in a 14 (e) action.

72

See generally Note, Tender Offers: The Liberalizatiov of Standing, supra note 12.

73480 F.2d at 362.
74

Id.

751d. at 363, quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
76 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
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In Electronic Specialty, the only previous case construing this
issue as it applies to section 14(e), a much narrower standard of
materiality was fashioned. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second
Circuit, saw fit to embrace the test underlying court decisions dealing
with proxy contests, seemingly on the rationale that tender offers
77
can be much likened to proxy contests in their fundamental features.
The rationale appears incongruous when compared to a statement in
the same opinion:
In effect section 14(e) applies rule 10-b both to the offeror
and to the opposition - very likely, except perhaps for any
bearing it may have on the issue of standing, only a codification of existing case law. 78
If indeed section 14 (e) only affects the scope of standing to sue
under rule 10b-5, then it follows that the basic test of materiality set
forth in List v. FashionPark, Inc., 79 and reaffirmed in S.E.C. v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,6o should be applicable. In List the court said:
The basic test of "materiality" . . . is whether "a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question."

"Materiality" encompasses those facts "which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the
corporation's stock or securities . . .,,"
The basic difference between this test (which is similar to the ChrisCraft test) and the one promulgated by Judge Friendly in Electronic
Specialty is that the latter looks to a determination of whether knowledge of the true facts would have compelled a different result,
whereas the former impliedly depends upon whether it might have
2
done so.0

Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir.
1969). The court reaffirmed the test announced in Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967) to wit:
...whether "any of the stockholders who tendered their shares would probably
not have tendered their shares" if the alleged violations had not occurred.
78 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d
Cir. 1969).
79340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
8°401 F.2d 833 (2d Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
7

1List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); quoting in part RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2) (a) (1938), and quoting in
part Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cit. 1963).
82See Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569, 632 n.
368 (1973).
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In addition, the court in Electronic Specialty confused the test
of materiality with that of reliance. It is much easier for a plaintiff to
show that a particular omission might have affected the decision of
a reasonable investor than it is to show that it did affect the plaintiff's
decision. The elements of materiality and reliance are separate and
distinct. 3 The test to be considered when determining materiality is
based on a reasonable man's evaluation of the weight given to a
representation in deciding on his choice of action.8 In sharp contrast,
the test to be considered when determining reliance is based on the
reasonable man's evaluation of the credibility and accuracy of defendant's representation. 5 Thus, to confuse the two needlessly intermingles two distinct areas and results in an overly difficult burden
of proof for the plaintiff. This burden is especially difficult in a tender
offer suit brought by either the target or the offeror wherein they
must show reliance by third party shareholders.
Finally, in light of human experience, which suggests that the
subjective decision-making process is subject to random inputs, none
of which can be quantified over a range of individual investors, it
seems appropriate to make use of a materiality test which does not
seek to quantify these variables.86 The Electronic Specialty test fails
in this regard, whereas the test put forth by Judge Timbers seemingly
does not. Thus, Judge Timbers' expansion of the standard of materiality is an eminently desirable and realistic broadening of its scope
under section 14 (e).
Scienter
In observing that a showing of culpability is requisite for proof
of scienter, Judge Timbers incorporated his concept of culpability
into the large body of law which has developed regarding the scienter
requirement of rule 10b-5. He defined culpability as knowing or reckless failure to ascertain and disclose those facts concerning which there
is a "duty of disclosure. '87 Judge Mansfield, however, felt that Judge
Timbers' reasoning on the issue of culpability had the effect of compounding already existing confusion as to the law in the area." He
further observed that Judge Timbers had provided "uncertain and

83

See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 (8th Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); wherein the court announced the elements necessary in a private action for
damages from misrepresentation or nondisclosure, to wit: 1. a misrepresentation or nondisclosure, 2. materiality, 3. some form of scienter or intent, and 4. reliance.

84See Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363, 386-87 (1973).
85

Id.

"See S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200-201
motives of man are too complex to separate."

(1963).

"The

87480 F.2d at 363.
8Id. at 398.
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apparently conflicting guidelines" concerning the nature and extent
of the duty to disclose. 9 On the one hand, Judge Timbers observed that
the duty is one which requires reasonable action on the part of a
corporate officer in discovering and disclosing facts material to the
exchange offer.9 0 But on the other hand, that statement was promptly
limited by the observation that "corporate officers have a reasonable
area of discretion in determining how far to explore the facts and in
deciding what facts need to be disclosed. So long as they operate within
this area, the securities laws do not impose liability."9 1
Judge Mansfield felt that:
. . . the scienter requirement would be met if the corporate officer (1) knew the essential facts and failed to disclose
them, or (2) failed or refused, after being put on notice of a
possible material failure in disclosure, to apprise himself of
the facts under circumstances where he could reasonably have
ascertained and disclosed them without any extraordinary
92
effort.
This standard of responsibility, he felt, was "in keeping with the
broad remedial aims of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.' ' 93 In conclusion, he observed that a corporate officer
with knowledge of material facts, according to the laws' standards,
"cannot in his discretion decide not to disclose them without facing
'' 4
liability under section 14 (e). 9
Several questions are raised by the different positions taken by
the two judges. An analysis of cases decided on the basis of rule 10b-5
by the Second Circuit, as well as several other circuits, points up the
unsettled state of the law with regard to the scienter requirement.
The basic problem revolving around the requirement of scienter
is whether the plaintiff may recover simply by showing that a misleading statement had been made, or whether he must prove some degree
of fault on the defendant's part. Three basic alternatives have been
suggested. They are: 1. absolute liability, i.e., the fact that the
statements made were false or misleading is sufficient to establish
liability; 2. intentional liability, i.e., the false or misleading statement
must have been made knowingly or with an intent to mislead; 3.
negligence liability, i.e., the defendant will be liable, even without
knowledge of the deception, if in the exercise of reasonable care he
should have had knowledge of it.95
89Id.

90 Id.at 369.
91Id.
92Id.at 398.
93Id.

94Id.at 399.
95 Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CM. L. REv. 824, 827
(1965).
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The first alternative, absolute liability, has been largely ignored
in recent cases, probably because of the effect such an approach would
have on the general field of securities transactions. 6 However, to a
large extent, as will be shown, the concept of absolute liability is
little more than a reflection of the holdings of the courts with regard
to the imputation of liability for knowingly failing to disclose material information. Nevertheless, the problem that has plagued the courts
has been that of distinguishing between the second and the third
alternatives.
The Second Circuit more than any other has examined the scienter
requirement, and largely as a result of differences in the language
chosen by the various judges in the circuit, much uncertainty still
remains regarding the status and nature of scienter. 97
In S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.," Judge Waterman, in the
principal opinion of the case, observed in his discussion of the law
applicable to insider trading without disclosure of material facts that
"the common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in
the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that
negligent insider trading has become unlawful . . ."99 He further
insisted that a "similar standard has been adopted in private

At least one case seemed to show a willingness to allow a plaintiff to sue under rule 10b-5
without pleading and proving scienter. See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond
Co., 187 F.Supp. 14, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub norm., Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ("a plaintiff purchaser
need only prove that a statement in a prospectus or oral communication is in fact false or
is a misleading omission."); cf Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.Supp. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
("It is sufficient to allege that defendants made untrue statements of material facts or
omitted to state material facts"). See also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
But several treatments of the subject have suggested that such an approach would retard
the goals of securities regulations. See Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private
Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud Rule lob-5, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1070, 1077-78 (1965); Note,
Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule lob-5, 32 U. CHL L. REV. 824, 834-35 (1965).
At least four positions on the scienter requirement can be discerned from the language
of the various judges in the Second Circuit. Judge Hays in Texas Gulf Sulphur would
have granted the injuction sought by the SEC and would not have remanded the case on
the issue of due diligence of the corporation, 401 F.2d 833, 869-70. Judge Waterman
in Texas Gulf Sulphur appeared willing to impute liability for negligence in private actions,
401 F.2d 833, 854-55. Judge Friendly would limit liability to situations in which actual
knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth is found, 401 F.2d at 867-68. And Judge
Moore dissented in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
-401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). A brief
outline of the facts is as follows. On November 12, 1963, a TGS exploration group completed drilling in an area considered to contain extensive mineral deposits. The evaluation
of the information from this drill hole was considered to be material information by the
Second Circuit, but prior to public disclosure, several insiders purchased TGS stock. On
April 16, 1964, TGS held a press conference to announce a substantial ore strike. Four
days prior to the conference, however, the company had attempted to clarify rumors
concerning the strike via a public statement. The SEC alleged that this statement (April
12 press release) was misleading and deceptive. The SEC brought suit under rule 10b-5
against both TGS insiders and TGS itself.
"SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cit. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
96
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actions. .. . "100
However, as Judge Friendly noted, the facts of the case
did not require such a holding, for it was clearly shown that the defendants hadfull knowledge of the undisclosed material facts therein. 10 1
Additional confusion was introduced through Judge Waterman's
statement concerning the April 12 press release when he noted:
It seems clear, however, that if corporate management dem-

onstrates that it was diligent in ascertaining that the information it published was the whole truth and that such
diligently obtained information was disseminated in good
faith, Rule 10b-5 would not have been violated. 02
The "due diligence" defense suggested by Judge Waterman clearly
implies a negligence standard. However, Judge Friendly felt that the
April 12 press release provided "the worst possible case for the award
of damages for merely negligent misstatement, as distinguished from
the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to willful fraud.' 01 3 The
fact that two judges specifically concurred with this aspect of Judge
Friendly's opinion, 104 and that two more dissented entirely from the
imposition of liability on the corporation for the misleading press
releases, 05 suggests that a majority of the court was not prepared to
allow the imposition of damages for merely negligent misrepresentations. 0
07
decided the same year as Texas Gulf SulIn Heit v. Weitzen,1
phur, the court discussed the opinions of both Judges Waterman and
Friendly and noted that, due to the fact that the complaints in issue

001Id. at 855. Judge Waterman, when making this statement, cited solely other circuits'

decisions as support. Id. at 855. This raises the question of whether he really meant to
apply a negligence standard in the second circuit. Although it is clear that Judge Waterman did not base his decision on negligent conduct on the part of defendants, he did
reinforce his dicta with a discussion of legislative intent and particularly with the following comment:
Moreover, a review of other sections of the Act from which Rule lob-5 seems
to have been drawn suggests that the implementation of a standard of conduct
that encompasses negligence as well as active fraud comports with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the Rule.
Id. at 855.
101Id. at 868 n. 4. Defendants' knowledge of the drill results was not in dispute. Id. at 852-53.

' Id. at 862. Judge Waterman felt that it would not be unfair to "impose upon corporate
management a duty to ascertain the truth of any statements" that a corporation releases,
whether to the shareholders or the investing public at large. Id. at 861.
1
03Id. at 868. Judge Friendly's basic disagreement with Judge Waterman appeared to be his
view of the conduct in question. Whereas Judge Waterman's dicta referred to negligence
and a "due diligence" defense, Judge Friendly felt that there was no question of due
diligence since the defendants were fully aware of the fact that the public was ignorant
of certain material facts. Rather, he saw the issue as one of recklessness on the part of
defendants. Id. at 868 n. 4.
104
Judges Kaufman and Anderson, id. at 869.
105Judges Moore and Lumbard, id. at 870.
06
' See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 562, 579 (1972).
107402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
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alleged actual knowledge as well as negligence, they were adequate

"whether the scienter test ultimately applied be strict or liberal."' 1
Despite ambigious statements in several cases to the effect that the
requirement of scienter should be eased, relaxation has not yet appeared to be necessary. In all the Second Circuit cases discussing the
scienter issue, actual knowledge has either been found or alleged.10 9
At least two other circuits have expressly or impliedly stated that
mere negligence is sufficient for 10b-5 liability in a private suit against
the maker of a misleading statement. The Eighth Circuit, in City
National Bank v. Vanderboom,"0 stated that it disagreed with the
Second Circuit insofar as that court did not accept a negligence test.
And the Tenth Circuit, in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,'" stated
that a defendant could avoid liability if he sustains the burden of

proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
would not have known, of the misrepresentations or omissions. The
statements of both courts, however, were unnecessary inasmuch as the
standing and the
Vanderboom case was dismissed on the issue of 112
misrepresentations.
knowing
involved
case
Mitchell
Thus, it seems that despite the different standards the various
circuits have been willing to apply to the scienter requirement, the
defendants in private actions have consistently either had actual
knowledge of the falsity of their misrepresentations or have acted
with reckless disregard of the truth. And although statements in a
number of cases which have discussed the scienter requirement can
be interpreted as approving a relaxation of standards, in none of these
cases has a private plaintiff recovered damages for merely negligent
3
conduct."

'M Id. at 914.
109
See Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (court dismissed
suit for lack of allegations of facts amounting to scienter while stating the allegation
of mere negligence is insufficient), Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (court noted that trend is
away from scienter requirement equal to fraud, but defendants had actual knowledge);
SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cit. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 920 (1969) (court held defendants' actions constituted common law fraud).
See also Bucklo, supra note 106, at 576-81.
110422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir. 1970), See also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th
Cir. 1961) (the Ninth Circuit stressed the fact that § 10(b) speaks in terms of "any
manipulative device or contrivance," implying a negligence standard).
111446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cit. 1971).
112

City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 232 (8th Cit. 1970); Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 96 (10th Cit. 1971).
(court used negligence
"13See, e.g., Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cit. 1970)
standard, but misrepresentations involved were knowing or reckless); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cit. 1965) (court said finding of negligence would suffice, but
misrepresentations were sufficient to find fraud); Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210 (9th Cit. 1962) (court stated that a prima facie case will be made when proof
of material misstatement or omission is shown, but defendant had actual knowledge).
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The question then becomes, where the standards elucidated by
Judge Timbers and Judge Mansfield fit on the continuum of various
catchphrases announced by the courts. This is best answered by an
analysis of what each of the judges said in enunciating his scienterculpability standards.
Judge Timbers felt that the function of the scienter requirement
is to confine liability "to those whose conduct has been sufficiently
culpable to justify the penalty sought to be exacted."114 In making a
determination of culpability, it is first necessary to discern what duty
of disclosure is imposed on the defendant. Thus, Judge Timbers
observed:
[w]hen making a representation, [those with greater access
to information] are required to ascertain what is material
as of the time of the transaction and to disclose fully "those
material facts about which the [investor] is presumably uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect
his judgments.115
He noted that a failure to perform these duties with due diligence in
issuing registration materials would be sufficient for liability under
section 11 of the 1933 Act, 116 but to justify a judgment under rule
10b-5 or section 14(e), sufficiently culpable conduct amounting to a
knowing or reckless failure to discharge these obligations must be
shown. 17
Thus Judge Timbers has apparently refused to accept the negligence standard which has surfaced in a number of 10b-5 cases. Rather,
at the very least, he has accepted as applicable to section 14(e) the
traditional view of scienter which has been used, notwithstanding the
various language employed by the circuit courts in their treatment of
10b-5 cases. But a further analysis leads to the conclusion that Judge
Timbers has made an important distinction in the scienter requirement under section 14(e) ; a distinction made more important by its
probable application to rule 10b-5 cases. Judge Timbers went beyond
the dichotomy made by all the courts between a knowing omission of a
material fact and an omission of a material fact due to a reckless
failure to ascertain that fact, and distinguished between a knowing
omission which was reasonable and one which was unreasonable. For
the first time a court has recognized the possibility that "culpability"
sufficient to justify the imputation of liability may not be present
despite the fact that defendant had knowledge of material informa-

114480 F.2d at 363.
115 Id.
11615

U.S.C. § 77k (1970).

117480 F.2d at 363.
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tion which was omitted. In the past, courts have uniformly held that
a failure to disclose material information, which was known to the
defendant, where there was a duty to disclose, was clearly sufficient
for the imputation of liability."' This surpasses mere negligence and
is tantamount to the imposition of absolute liability, subject to only
two requirements: "knowledge" and a "material" omission. Judge
Timbers, on the other hand, has seen fit to recognize the disparity
between a decision on the materiality of a particular piece of information made by a corporate executive and that made by a judge sitting
in the quiet of his chambers. While shrouding his language in the
ambiguity of the term "culpability", Judge Timbers has, in fact, held
that where a corporate officer's determination (that information was
not material) is reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances,
liability will not be imputed for failing to disclose that information.
This is to be contrasted with the previous rulings on the issue which
skirted the problem and thus impliedly held that the reasonableness
of the decision was irrelevant.119
Judge Mansfield, on the other hand, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, initially appears to be proferring the traditional
scienter standard. His statement that the use of the words "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative" in section 14(e) by Congress,
coupled with the similar language of section 10 (b), indicates a congressional purpose "not to punish mere negligence,"120 is compatible
with both the traditional view of the Second Circuit in rule 10b-5 cases
and Judge Timbers' statements in Chris-Craft.However, his observation on the proof requisite for a satisfaction of the scienter requirement is at odds with both of these views.121 In point of fact, despite
Judge Mansfield's repeated assertions that proof of more than mere
negligence is necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement, his definition of that requirement would be satisfied by mere negligence in
failing to ascertain a material fact. Thus it is the definition of the

118See Bucklo, supra note 106, at 575.

119
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir. 1971) (court
stated that defendant could avoid liability if he sustained burden of proving that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care would not have known, of the challenged
misrepresentations or omissions); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1291 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (court stated that there was
an accusation of actual knowledge of material misrepresentations and omissions sufficient
to satisfy the scienter requirement).
120
121

480 F.2d at 397.
Judge Timbers stated:
The scienter requirement would be satisfied upon a showing that the person
charged knew the material facts misstated or omitted and could reasonably have
been expected to appreciate their significance .... or, if he did not know them,
that he had reasonable cause to believe that there might be a material failure
in disclosure and yet did not ascertain and disclose the facts even though he
could have done so without any undue effort.
Id. at 398. This gives every appearance of being a negligence standard.
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scienter requirement, as well as the term "culpability" used by Judge
Timbers, that differentiates the two opinions in the case. While Judge
Timbers has chosen to forge a new tool for restricting the imputation
of liability, Judge Mansfield has surfaced as part of a distinct minority
which has been attempting to relax the scienter requirements.
Two questions still remain. Which view, if either, would appear
to be the better one? And, would it make a difference in this case?
An analysis of the views of the two judges must, of necessity,
involve a comparison between two dissimilar issues. Judge Timbers
put forth a limiting measure on the imputation of liability for knowing
omission of a material fact. Judge Mansfield, however, attempted to
extend liability to conduct amounting to negligence in failing to ascertain a material fact. The distinction is sufficient to require separate
treatment.
Judge Timbers, in imposing a restriction on the imputation of
liability for knowing omissions, has conformed his reasoning to the
reality of the situation. It seems patently inequitable to suggest that
liability should rest solely on the basis of whether the decision of a
judge, with the benefit of hindsight, concerning the materiality of
non-disclosed information agrees with the decision of a corporate
executive with all the attendant pressures. As noted by Judge Timbers,
it is important to take cognizance of Judge Friendly's statement in
Electronic Specialty:
The likeness of tender offers to proxy contests is not limited to the issue of standing. They are alike in the fundamental feature that they generally are contests. This means
that participants on both sides act, not in the peace of a quiet
chamber [Citations Omitted] ; but under the stresses of the
market place. They act quickly, sometimes impulsively, often
in angry response to what they consider, whether rightly
or wrongly, to be low blows by the other side. Probably there
will no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial.
Congress intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing,
not to impose an unrealistic requirement of laboratory conditions .... 122
It would appear that Judge Timbers has removed some of the laboratory-like conditions in the consideration of knowing omissions and has
substituted, via a reasonableness standard, the exigencies of the
market place.
Judge Mansfield, on the other hand, felt that a corporate executive
with knowledge of material facts could not escape liability for failing to disclose these facts. The fatal flaw in this reasoning is his
122

Id. at 362 n. 14.
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unwillingness to permit the defendant a standard of reasonableness
in determining what is material. The liabilities under either rule 10b-5
or section 14 (e) are too great to employ an absolute liability standard
which would impute liability for even a reasonable mistake in judgment. For this reason, it seems that the standard proposed by Judge
Timbers is the better one with regard to knowing omissions.
In comparing the scienter requirement of rule 10b-5 to that of
section 14 (e) for failing to discover material information, it is necessary to take cognizance of several factors. First, the fact that rule
10b-5 is such a broad provision and covers a variety of circumstances
somewhat justifies a refusal to impute liability for mere negligence.
Such is not true of section 14(e). Section 14(e) applies only "in connection with any tender offer," and, though the area included by the
definition of tender offers is large, it does not approach that of rule
10b-5. Second, rule 10b-5 was formulated under a statutory provision
which permits the SEC to promulgate regulations to prevent the use
of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."12 For this
reason, it has been argued that these very words imply a degree of
intent. Thus some form of scienter must be proven or the rule would be
outside the scope of the Commission's authority. 24 Again, this limitation does not hold true for section 14 (e). Since section 14 (e) is selfenforcing, it has no need for implementing rules. Furthermore, the
section can effectively be separated into two subsections, permitting
liability to be based on a violation of the section without considering
the limiting words - "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices ....,,12s
Third, and probably most important, one of the major problems
with the private-enforcement concept of securities regulations has
been the disproportionate amount of damages for which an insider
may be liable. Thus, it has been suggested that the issue of damages
126
and the state of the defendant's mind must be considered together.
Undoubtedly, courts, when considering 10b-5 cases, pay careful attention to the potential liability when delineating the requirement of
scienter. This need not be the case under section 14 (e). The wide
variety of relief available to the courts, together with the totally
different nature of the damages, should cause the courts markedly
less anxiety over the potential liability for violations of section
127
14 (e).
121934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
124

See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F.Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964).

1251934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)

(1970). See text accompanying note 32 supra.

1

16See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur -The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule
lob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 427 (1968).
17 In rule lob-5 actions, the selling shareholder would receive as damages the difference
between the market price at the time of sale and the market price at a later date. See
(Continued on next page)
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Thus, it would seem that many of the restrictions under rule 10b-5,
which arguably would prevent the use of a scienter requirement that
includes mere negligence for failing to ascertain material facts, do not
apply to section 14 (e). However, this does not answer the question of
which standard would be better, but only suggests that there are
fewer arguments against Judge Mansfield's view under section 14 (e)
than there would be under rule 10b-5. The question, then, is which
standard furthers the goals of the securities legislation more effectively. The answer appears to be that standard which minimizes
investor injury as a result of corporate misrepresentation, maximizes
the flow of information to that same investor, and results in the protection of potential defendants from liability in the absence of substandard conduct. Since in the case of a tender offer the flow of
information to the shareholders is statutorily mandated,128 it would
appear that the flow of information to the shareholder-investor cannot
be affected. At the same time, the employment of a negligence standard
prevents the imposition of absolute liability as has been the case with
knowing omissions. For these reasons, the minimization of investor
injury and the most effective method of furthering the goals of the
securities legislation can best be accomplished by the employment
of a scienter requirement which includes mere negligence in failing to
ascertain material facts - Judge Mansfield's standard.
To answer the final question - whether there would be any
difference in the result in the case under either of the two standards resort must be had to the findings of the court in regard to the liability
of defendants for the specific allegations of violations of section 14 (e).
Judge Timbers found that the Piper family had violated section
14 (e) in their letters to shareholders on January 27 and 28, in their
press release of January 29, and in their letters to shareholders on
June 4 and July 25. He felt that the reference to "inadequate" in the
letters of January 27 and 28 pertained to price, and therefore had a
material bearing on a reasonable investor's decision. 129 This, coupled
with the fact that First Boston had given Piper its opinion that the
price was "fair and equitable," was sufficient, he felt, to show a knowing misrepresentation. He similarly found the omission of the "put"

(Continued from preceding page)

Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F.Supp. 128, 147 (D. Md. 1968). However, the Chris-Craft
court felt that the measure of damages to CCI would be the reduction in appraisal value
of CCI's Piper holdings due to BPC's having acquired a majority interest in Piper. The
nature of the damages should cause much less concern over the possibility of dramatic
sums being awarded.
12
(1970) and
8 This is a result of the combined effect of § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §78(n) (d)
§14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (e) (1970). See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 supra.
12480 F.2d at 364.
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arrangement with Grumman from the January 29 press release as
well as the omission of the agreement between Piper and BPC in the
June 4 and July 25 letters to be violations of section 14(e).13o
Judge Timbers further held that BPC and its officers and First
Boston and its officers had violated section 14 (e) by failing to include
material information in BPC's registration statement. He found that
BPC was required to disclose to Piper shareholders the circumstances
surrounding the negotiation for the sale of the BAR, and to inform
them of the effects this might have on the operations of BPC. 31 In
all of these holdings he found that the "culpability" of the defendants
was sufficient to justify liability. Consequently, it would appear that
under either Judge Timbers' or Judge Mansfield's standard for knowing ommissions, the results would be similar.
In addition, Judge Timbers found that First Boston's failure to
investigate BPC's intentions with regard to the BAR after being put
on notice of discussions with regard to its disposal amounted to "com132
plete abdication of its responsibilities to potential investors.
To arrive at the latter holding, Judge Timbers first had to
negotiate the question of whether section 14 (e) imposes liability upon
an underwriter in favor of a competing offeror. In determining that
it did, he cited self-regulation as the mainspring of the federal securities laws, and he observed that, due to the relationship between the
underwriter and the registrant, "[t]he representations in the registration statement are those of the underwriter as much as they are
1 33
those of the issuer."
Judge Timbers felt it unnecessary to determine whether a reasonableness standard should be imposed under section 14 (e) since "First
Boston's conduct ... went far beyond mere negligence."13 4 This view
is questionable. In discussing First Boston's culpability, Judge Timbers
observed that even if the minutes of the May 21 board meeting were
not sufficient in themselves to lead a "reasonable" person to believe
that the registration statement was misleading, a "reasonable" person
would have explored further.135 He then concluded that "First Boston
possessed enough information reasonably to deduce that the BPC
registration statement was materially inaccurate."136 Despite his protestation, Judge Timbers' language and holding sounds suspiciously

130

1d.

13 Id. at 368.
1

32Id. at 373.

1

3id.

14Id.

at 370.
at 373 n. 26.

'3 Id. at 372.
136Id. at 373.
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like a "reasonable man" standard - due digilence in discovering material information. Thus, although it appears there would be no difference
in the court's holdings under either Judge Timbers' or Judge Mansfield's standards for the scienter requirement, there is a strong suggestion that, in applying his standard, Judge Timbers was in reality
137
using an identical test to the one Judge Mansfield has promulgated.
To summarize, it would appear that, despite denials by both
judges, they have indeed imputed liability under section 14(e) for
mere negligence.
Causation
Judge Timbers next discussed the issue of causation. He first
observed the CCI need not show it relied on the defendant's deception,
but rather that the target corporation's stockholders relied on a misrepresentation that caused CCI's injury. 13 He then cited the Supreme
Court in its opinions in Mills v. Electic Auto-Lite Co. 39 and Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States1 4 as support for the proposition that a
presumption of reliance will be established where it is logical to assume
that reliance existed, thus avoiding the impracticality of proving
actual reliance. Judge Timbers noted that effectuating Congressional
intent is best accomplished by resolving doubts in favor of those the
141
statute is designed to protect.
Judge Mansfield, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, felt
that Judge Timbers' application of the Mills-Ute test via a presumption
of reliance where material misrepresentations are shown did not go
far enough. He noted that the Supreme Court in Mills and Affiliated
Ute did not use the term presumption, nor did they indicate in any
manner that the concept of presumption was applicable.1 4 He felt that
the Supreme Court did not stop short at merely shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant, but rather established a rule of law: reasonable reliance is found as a matter of law when a material misrepre143
sentation is shown.
137In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), Judge Timbers, in a concurring
and dissenting opinion, concurs with the dissent of Judge Hays, who would have held
an outside director liable for negligently failing to discover material omissions in
representations made to a prospective purchaser of the corporation's stock. Although
Judge Timbers felt that the conduct in question went beyond mere negligence to
reckless disregard for the truth, much as he stated in the Chris-Craft opinion concerning
First Boston, he went on to state that he did not necessarily disagree with Judge Hays'
views on the scienter-negligence issue, but would prefer to wait until the issue was
clearly presented to the court.
13 480 F.2d at 341.
1391d. at 374, citing 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
140 Id., citing 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
141Id. at 375.
142Id.

at 400.

143
Id.
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The issue of reliance, like that of scienter, is presently in a state
of confusion. Three classes of cases have been delineated. Each must
be referred to in order to determine the standard of reliance that must
be met: 1. cases wherein defendant knowingly makes affirmative
misrepresentations; 2. cases wherein defendant makes negligent
misrepresentations; and 3. cases wherein defendant omits material
information. 1u
The two categories that the Chris-Craftcourt was concerned with
those
involving misrepresentations known to be false, and those
are
involving omissions. These two categories differ in one basic respect "reliance on the nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult matter
to define or prove.' ' 45 Reliance requires an acceptance of the credibility
of the fact represented. Where there is no fact represented, 46 it is
virtually impossible to prove reliance.147 For this reason the two
normally are treated separately. The Supreme Court in Mills and
Affiliated Ute dealt with reliance and causation as they apply to
material omissions. In Mills, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
after defining materiality in several ways including the definition used
by the Chris-Craft court, observed that this definition "embodies a
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it was con4 Thus he concluded
sidered important by a reasonable shareholder ....
that a finding of materiality is sufficient to 49show the causal relationship between the violation and the injury.'
In Affiliated Ute, the Court went one step further. Finding that
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery,'1 the Court
held that the "obligation to disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact."''
Thus, it would seem that the presumption that Judge Timbers
referred to is not a presumption at all, but rather a rule of law. However, it would appear that a better approach might be to consider

1"See Note, The Reliance Requirement, supra note 84, at 364.
14s
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970).
'"List v.Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965),
stated that plaintiff need not prove active reliance on the defendant's silence, thereby
rejecting concept that defendant was representing the converse of the omitted matter
by maintaining silence.
17 See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement, supra note 84, at 379-80.
148Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). The definition used by the
Chris-Craft court was:
whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented)
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question'
480 F.2d at 363.
149 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
'"Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
"I Id. at 154.
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omissions in two classifications: 1. intentional omissions, and 2. negligent omissions. In this way, a conclusive presumption of reliance
might exist in the case of material omissions that were intentional or
recklessly negligent, and a rebuttable presumption of reliance would
result from material omissions that were caused by mere negligence.
Judge Timbers did not state in his opinion whether the presumption
of reliance which he found, was rebuttable or conclusive. Under the
approach suggested, it would have been unnecessary since he felt that
the material omissions in Chris-Craft were due to more than mere
negligence. This rule also can be analogized to the standards for
reliance in the case of material misrepresentations. A number of courts
have held that the plaintiff need not prove that his reliance was
reasonable, when the misrepresentations were known by the defendant
to be false or misleading.152 The fact that plaintiff actually relied is
deemed to be sufficient. Although the courts have not articulated the
underlying rationale for these holdings, the fact that to hold otherwise is tantamount to permitting contributory negligence as a defense
to an intentional tort is most likely of primary importance. In sharp
contrast, where the material misrepresentations were negligently
caused, "reasonable" reliance has been the standard 153
Predictably, the rule would not alter the outcome of the holdings
in Chris-Craft. Judge Timbers, despite language which implied that
First Boston's liability with regard to the omissions in BPC's registration statement was a result of mere negligence, based his holdings
on "a knowing or reckless failure to discharge..." the affirmative duty
of disclosure.15
The court declined to treat the misrepresentations in the Piper
family letters to shareholders on January 27 and 28, any differently
from the rest of the violations of 14 (e). That the Mills and Affiliated
Ute Courts were considering failures to disclose (as opposed to positive
misrepresentations) did not seem to matter.1 55 It is difficult to criticize
this approach. The burden of proof, where it is third party shareholders who must be shown to have relied, is very similar to that of
In See Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 992
(5th Cir. 1969); John Hopkins University v. Hutton, 326 F.Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971);
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F.Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd as
to compensatory damages, rev'd as to punitive damages, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cit. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement, supra
note 84, at 370-73.
Is See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th
Cit.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970)
154480 F.2d at 363.

s In Mills, liability was based on insufficient disclosure of the relationship of the Autolite
board of directors, which endorsed a merger between Autolite and Mergenthaler Linotype
Co. in a proxy statement to Mergenthaler. In Affiliated Ute, liability was based on defendants' failure to disclose the fact that they could gain financially from the transactions
involved.
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showing reliance on an omission (i.e., next to impossible). For this
reason, where there is little if any direction from the Supreme Court
as to what would be the correct approach, a presumption of causation
would seem to best effectuate the purpose of the securities laws. In
this instance, however, since the nature of a misrepresentation is somewhat different from that of an omission and since there is a recognizable relationship between a misrepresentation and reliance thereon,
it seems unnecessary to impose such a strict rule on defendants. Accordingly, the presumption should probably be rebuttable by showing,
depending upon whether the misrepresentation was intentional or
negligent, either unreasonable reliance or no reliance whatsoever.
Thus, although the court in Chris-Craft has not helped to clear
the confusion which presently surrounds the issue of reliance, it does
appear that its results were correct.
Judge Timbers then proceeded to the more straightforward issue
of what results flowed from the various violations of section 14 (e). He
held the violations to have caused "a denial to CCI of a fair opportunity to compete for control of Piper. ' ' 156 The specific injury sustained was found to be a reduction in the value of CCI's Piper holdings. All of the aforementioned violations by various defendants were
held to have contributed in some measure to this injury, with the
exception of the June 4 and July 25 letters to Piper shareholders from
the Piper family. 5 7 Despite the fact that these letters omitted material
facts, their effect was rendered negligible by the action of CCI which
had written letters of rebuttal on July 16 detailing the omitted facts.
Relief to be Granted
In determining the relief to be granted CCI, Judge Timbers
appropriately considered two variants: damages and equitable relief.
He first dismissed divestiture of BPC's illegally obtained shares as
inappropriate due to administrative difficulties and the desire not to
reopen the control contest.'- Although this reasoning is not overly
persuasive, courts may undoubtedly refuse to order divestiture for
several reasons. 5 9 The Chris-Craft court might have picked any of
them. First, forcing such a large block of shares onto the market would,
in all probability, depress the price of the stock for some length of
time. Innocent shareholders, and in this case the plaintiff, CCI, would
suffer inordinate losses as a result. Second, divestiture by the successful contestant might, as it would in this case, leave the target company
without effective management for a time, since (presumably) management of the target would have been taken over by the successful con56 Id. at 375.
7

Id. at 376-77.
ImId. at 379.
1

1s9
See Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 11. at 401.
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testant which, in all likelihood, would immediately withdraw its officers
upon forced divestiture. Admittedly, it might be successfully argued
that in a contested takeover the minority shareholders, losers in the
contest, would readily assume the management of the target. In
reality, however, the passage of time between the takeover contest and
the outcome of a court fight would work to the disadvantage of the
contest loser. In all likelihood substantial changes would have taken
place in both the target company and the attitude of the loser toward
it. This latter reason seems to be the true rationale behind Judge
Timbers' statement on divestiture, as he was careful to point out that
CCI "no longer desires to take control of a company that has been substantially changed.""16
Judge Timbers next made an assessment of exactly what damages
should be measured- the reduction in the appraisal value of CCM's
Piper holdings attributable to BPC's ill-won victory in their takeover
contest.161 He further felt that since all of the defendants contributed
in some measure to this victory through their violations of the securities laws, joint and several liability would be appropriate. 62 Little of
this can seriously be criticized. An analysis of alternatives serves only
to emphasize that the question of relief available for violations of
section 14 (e) is undoubtedly the most perplexing aspect of this section.
The question of damages under section 14 (e) is sure to plague the
courts in the future, and the question will be doubly difficult due to
the very nature of section 14 (e) violations which are sure to differ
greatly in every case. As a result, courts will be forced to fashion their
own forms of relief, and particularly their own forms of damages,
with little help from previous cases.
In examining the question of equitable relief, Judge Timbers felt
that BPC should be denied the fruits of its illegal victory. He therefore
directed the district court to include in its judgment an injunction barring BPC from voting the shares it obtained through its exchange
offer, for a period of at least five years.1 63 This instruction undercut
the rationale behind Judge Friendly's dicta in Electronic Specialty
wherein he flatly rejected permanent deprivation of voting rights as a
viable form of relief. 1" He reasoned that deprivation of voting rights
would be nothing more than "a disguised method of forcing divestiture," and that leaving the direction of an enterprise to 45% of the
stock "would be decidedly unhealthy."1 65 Judge Timbers found little

16480 F.2d at 379.
161Id. at 380.
162
Id.
163

Id.
1"409 F.2d at 947.
165Id. at 948.
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merit in the latter assertion, and dealt with the former by imposing
a temporary rather than a permanent injunction. Nonvoting stock is
commonplace in today's corporate world. There are no inequalities
inherent in the control of a corporation by minority financial interests.
Abuse is far more likely in the normal structure of common and preferred classes. Manipulation by the voting common to the detriment of
the nonvoting preferred is easily accomplished, whereas here the voting common could hardly affect the nonvoting common without equally
166
affecting itself.
The first objection that Judge Friendly had made to barring the
voting rights of the victor - that it would be nothing more than an
indirect method of forcing divestiture - would have been more of a
problem were it not for Judge Timbers' use of a temporary restriction.
Such a restriction should not cause a divestiture. Despite the lack of
control, the investment might remain lucrative. The fact that the
voting right will be restored in the future, and with it control, offers
an even greater incentive to retain the stock. Moreover, even if the
successful contender decides to divest, the option of waiting until the
market favors disposal of a large number of the target's shares offers
possible mitigating relief and greatly lessens the harm to innocent
shareholders.167 That Judge Timbers only deprived BPC of its voting
right to the illegally obtained stock, approximately 7% of the outstanding shares of Piper, should serve to prevent any precipitous
dumping of Piper stock. 68 Indeed, the apparently temperate impact
of the remedy, together with its general flexibility, promises frequent
use of this form of injunctive relief for future violations of section
14(e).
Ramifications of Chris-Craft
The court has, through its holdings in Chris-Craft, effectively
opened the federal courts to suits brought by offerors against target
companies. Although this is clearly a result the Williams Act was intended to effect, it appears that the Act has imposed a number of
hardships on target companies seeking to defend against a takeover
bid. This result would clearly be opposite that intended by the framers
of the original act, who felt it was necessary to protect incumbent

1

66See Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 11, at 402.

167

Id.

11 During the contest for control of Piper Aircraft there were 1,644,890 shares of Piper
stock issued and outstanding. The culmination of the contest found BPC with 839,306
shares (51%). Of this amount 120,200 shares were purchased by BPC while awaiting
SEC action on its exchange offer, a violation of rule 10b-6; and 111,628 shares were
purchased by BPC through its exchange offer, the registration statement for which was
found to be materially misleading. Thus, approximately 7% (233,828 shares) were
purchased illegally and the voting rights to these shares were accordingly revoked for
five years by Judge Timbers.
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management from "corporate raiders"'169 and, to a lesser extent, would
circumvent the intentions of Congress which desired a balanced law
to provide both the offeror and management an equal opportunity to
present their cases fairly.170
One of the most effective methods of fighting a tender offer is
through communications of management's position to the shareholders. This is commonly accomplished through letters, advertisements in the press, personal contacts, and press releases. In the past,
incumbent management has been in a unique position to create uncertainty as to the inadequacy of a tender offer price.171 But now the
standard argument of management - that the company's stock must
be worth more if the offeror is willing to pay the offered price - has
been irreparably damaged by the Chris-Craftruling. Target companies
will now be forced to justify, carefully, their statements to shareholders.
The full implications of this can not be recognized until several
other factors are taken into account. A well known principle of the
tender offer procedure is that "time is of-the-essence,"1 2 both for the
offeror and for the target. The target has only a short time to get its
information and recommendations to the shareholders, and any delay
at the offering stage can be disastrous. However, SEC rule 14D-4 73
requires that management file a schedule 14D17 4 with the SEC before
any affirmative action to combat the takeover attempt is taken. This
schedule requires, among other things, a statement of the reasons
behind the recommendation to accept or to reject the tender offer. The
preparation of this document takes time, and effectively permits the
offer to go unopposed for a period of time. Furthermore, the effect of
Chris-Craft is to force incumbent management to disclose, in both the
Schedule D statement and in communications to shareholders, material
information which would have a detrimental effect on its defense. This
would be so even if the information might appear disproportionately
damaging in the eyes of the shareholders while, in fact, its long term
effects on the company might be minimal. In the event that target
management does not wish to communicate this information to its
shareholders, its only alternative is not to make a recommendation at
all. The result seems harsh, though unfortunately unavoidable.

169

See note 4 supra.

supra note 1, at 2813.
and Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids -Defense

170 2 U.S. CODE NEws,
171 Schmultz

Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115, 121

(1967).

17 id. at 115.
17317 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1973).

17417 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1973).
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At the same time that target management is faced with this
communication problem, and is now so easily attacked by the offeror,
the target has apparently not been given any additional basis for
challenging the offeror. On the contrary, there seems less of a chance
for the target to successfully challenge the takeover bid in court. Prior
to the Williams Act there were no clear guidelines on what information
a tender offeror should disclose in making his tender offer. As a result,
targets were able to challenge offerors in court on the basis of alleged
violations of rule 10b-5. While it is true that these suits, in the main,
were not very successful, the courts did give the appearance of slowly
coming around to recognizing the validity of this type of action.175
The Williams Act limits the grounds upon which a target can challenge
the offeror, since the disclosure requirements of the offeror are not
difficult to meet, and if they are met, they severely confine the area
that the target can attack.76
The Chris-Craftcourt attempted to balance these problems when
it recognized that Piper's effort to avert the takeover by using the
standard argument of management - that the company's stock must
be worth more if the offeror is willing to pay the offered price - was a
common response to such an action,' n but, rather, that it was their
failure to communicate all the material information (i.e., the fact that
their underwriters thought the offered price to be equitable) to their
shareholders which constituted the violation of section 14 (e). Nevertheless, the court has written an opinion under which the offeror faces
fewer difficulties in completing a takeover attempt than might have
initially been expected under the Williams Act. Though it is too soon
to gauge what the effects will be on likely target companies, it does
appear that the results may very well take a heretofore unexpected
turn.
Conclusion
The legislative history clearly indicates that the purpose of the
Williams Act was to close the "gap" in federal securities regulation.
This "gap" was illuminated in the 1960's when the cash tender offer,
for a number of reasons, became a preferred method of corporate acquistion. In Christ-Craft the Second Circuit Court of Appeals gave
effect to the broad antifraud provisions of the Act. The court recognized that section 14 (e) largely tracks rule 10b-5 and wisely chose to

175 See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F.Supp. 910, aff'd,
425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); see generally Lowenfels,
The Demise ot the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268
(1968).
176Kennedy, Defensive Take-Over Procedures Since the Williams Act, 19 CATH. U. L. REV.
158, 175-76 (1969).
177 480 F.2d at 365.
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pattern its decision primarily on ,substantive law under rule 10b-5. In
so doing, the court has possibly put a burden on the target of a takeover attempt that the framers of the Act never intended.
In spite of this, the courts would be wise to continue concentrating
on ensuring procedural fairness to all parties involved in a tender
offer. In the event it appears that too great a burden has been placed
on the target corporation, and the economics of the situation demand
a rethinking of the regulations concerning takeovers, the legislature
is the proper forum in which the review should take place. In such case,
the legislature might give serious thought to policy considerations
which would recognize that it is, after all, the target corporation and
the nontendering shareholders who must be protected along with the
tendering shareholders and the investing public at large.
Alan J. Rosst
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